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Introduction 
A year and a half after the dramatic arrest of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s gas-
centrifuge program, much has been learned about his illicit, transnational nuclear smuggling 
network, called the “Khan network.” Key questions, however, remain unanswered about this 
network’s customers and inner workings. Understanding the Khan network is critical to ensuring 
that it is no longer operating and for safeguarding against a similar network emerging in the future.  
This article provides a brief overview of what the Khan network offered to its customers and 
describe some of the efforts to fix holes in the international nonproliferation system that are being 
exposed by the investigations into Khan’s activities. 
Origin of the Khan Network  
The Khan network was, first and foremost, an elaborate and highly successful illicit procurement 
network that Khan created in the 1970s in order to supply Pakistan’s gas centrifuge program. The 
developing program aimed to make highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. He built 
his centrifuge procurement network on an extensive collection of sensitive information that he 
stole or otherwise acquired in Europe in the middle and late 1970s. In addition, he was involved in 
acquiring overseas nuclear weapon technology for Pakistan and procuring equipment and 
materials for this endeavor. 
Because of Pakistan’s weak industrial infrastructure, it was unable to develop gas centrifuges or 
nuclear weapons without extensive foreign assistance. Khan had to rely on the support of many 
foreign businessmen and experts and on the supply of goods and technologies from foreign 
countries, especially in Europe. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is still dependent on the 
foreign supply of spare parts, special materials, and instruments. 
Khan and his associates slowly expanded their import operation into a transnational illegal 
network that exported whole gas centrifuges and production capabilities, as well as designs for 
nuclear weapons, mostly to Muslim countries. By the late 1990s, the Khan network had evolved 
into an organization that could provide “one-stop shopping,” both for the wherewithal to produce 
weapons-grade uranium and for nuclear weapons designs and instructions. The motive was to 
turn a profit while providing additional business for their international collaborators. In addition to 
money, Khan was also motivated by pan-Islamism and its hostility to Western controls on nuclear 
technology. 
Key Customers and Offers 
Khan has admitted that his main customers were Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Reports indicate 
that other countries, including Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, were offered assistance, but they 
purportedly turned down the offers. However, investigators are still trying to verify these claims 
and determine exactly what assistance each country accepted and refused. In addition, questions 
remain as to whether members of the Khan network, including Khan himself, offered nuclear 
weapon assistance to terrorists in Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban. 
Iran 
Khan appears to have attracted Iran as his first major customer in 1987, during a brief period in 
which relations between Iran and Pakistan were warming.[1] Iran reportedly told the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it received only some of the offered items, in particular, 
centrifuge designs and sample centrifuges. Iran told the IAEA it did not take other items in the 
offer, namely, those related to the manufacture of nuclear weapons components. The IAEA has 
asked Iran for clarifications and additional information about the offer. 
When inspectors first saw the Iranian centrifuges in February 2003, they recognized the obviously 
Dutch-origin centrifuge design, but noted that it had been modified in distinctive ways. The Khan 
network’s assistance, even if limited to drawings and a few components, was apparent and 
allowed Iran to skip many difficult research steps. 
In 1994 and 1995 Iran received additional assistance from the Khan network. According to the 
Malaysian police report, Khan asked his partner, B.S.A. Tahir, to send two containers of P1 
centrifuges to Iran. By this time, Pakistan is known to have replaced its P1 centrifuge with a more 
advanced and sophisticated P2 centrifuge. By selling the P1s, Khan, in essence, sold off surplus 
components that Pakistan no longer wanted. During the same time period, Iran reportedly also 
received additional documentation on the design and manufacture of the P1 centrifuge. 
Putting in such a large order implied, however, that Iran had decided on a particular centrifuge 
design. It also indicated that by the mid-1990s, Iran was ready to assemble a pilot plant and build 
a large number of centrifuges. 
By 1995 or 1996, Iran also received the drawings for the P2 centrifuge from the Khan network. 
Although Iran has stated that it did not work on the P2 until 2002, the IAEA has raised questions 
about this chronology, and its investigations continue. 
Iran continued to receive assistance from the Khan network after 1996. Meetings with a Khan 
intermediary continued and included discussions on technical issues. According to Iranian 
information, 13 official meetings took place with the clandestine supply network between 1994 
and 1999. Questions remain as to whether meetings occurred after 1999.[2] 
Iran continues to deny that it received any nuclear weapons designs or manufacturing assistance 
from the network. Pakistan also denies such assistance. Nonetheless, investigations continue. 
Iraq 
In late 1990, shortly after Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait and the UN Security Council imposed 
an embargo on Iraq, Khan offered Iraq assistance in building centrifuges and making nuclear 
weapons. This offer is detailed in a set of documents found by UN inspectors at the farm of 
Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, after his 1995 defection. 
One of the documents, dated October 6, 1990, is a one-page memo from the Iraqi intelligence 
service, Mukhabarat, addressed to a contact person in Iraq’s main nuclear weapons program 
(codenamed PC-3). It summarizes a meeting between members of the Mukhabarat and an 
intermediary who said he represented A.Q. Khan. The meeting took place in the offices of the 
Technical Consultation Corporation (TCC)—a procurement organization of the Mukhabarat.[3] 
This memo states that the intermediary approached the Mukhabarat with the following offer: Khan 
was prepared to give Iraq project designs for a nuclear weapon and to provide assistance in 
enriching uranium and manufacturing a nuclear weapon. He would also acquire any necessities 
or materials from Western European countries through a company Khan owned in Dubai. 
The intermediary requested a preliminary technical meeting to discuss the documents that Kahn 
was willing to sell. The memo notes that a meeting with Khan directly was not possible at that 
time, however, given the tense international atmosphere resulting from Iraq’s continued 
occupation of Kuwait and the impending attack by Coalition forces. Rather, an alternative of 
setting up a meeting in Greece with an intermediary who had good relations with the Iraqi 
intelligence agents was mentioned as a possibility. In the memo, Iraqi intelligence officials said 
that they believed the motive was money.  
Another document found by UN inspectors was PC-3’s response to the Mukhabarat office. PC-3 
was dubious about the offer and was concerned that it could be a sting operation. Nonetheless, 
PC-3 advised the Mukhabarat to try to obtain a sample of what was being offered. However, in 
post-1995 discussions, former leaders of the PC-3 program repeatedly told inspectors that no 
such samples were ever received. Given that the offer occurred just three months before the start 
of the Persian Gulf War, this might have resulted from lack of time rather than lack of mutual 
intent.  
In its reporting to the Security Council in the late 1990s, the IAEA recorded its concerns about this 
matter, not only with respect to its potential direct effect on Iraq’s endeavors to acquire nuclear 
weapons, but also in the global arena of nuclear weapons proliferation. The IAEA invested 
significant effort in attempting to resolve this matter in its interactions with both Iraqi and with 
Pakistani officials. When approached about this matter by the media in the late 1990s, the 
Pakistani government and Khan vehemently denied making any such offer. When, in December 
1998, the IAEA inspectors departed from Iraq, the issue remained one of a small number of 
outstanding questions and concerns. 
Libya 
The Khan network’s most ambitious sale was to Libya. It committed to supply Libya with a wide 
range of items, including a turnkey gas centrifuge plant, the wherewithal to make centrifuges, 
nuclear weapons designs, uranium hexafluoride, and the ability to make uranium hexafluoride. 
Fortunately, at the time Libya renounced nuclear weapons in late 2003, it had not yet received 
many of these items. 
Unlike Iran, Libya has provided a credible accounting of the assistance it received from the Khan 
network. The network’s first major sale to Libya was in 1997. According to a Malaysian police 
report, Libya contacted Khan for help and expertise in gas centrifuges.  
In 1997, Libya bought 20 pre-assembled P1 centrifuges, which it called L-1 centrifuges. These 
surplus or retired machines from Pakistan started arriving in 1997. Khan also sold Libya another 
200 P1 centrifuges, process gas-feed and withdrawal systems, uranium hexafluoride cylinders, 
and frequency converters.[4] The feed and withdrawal systems, the frequency converters for 
small cascades, and some of the centrifuge components were supplied by the network outside of 
Pakistan.  
According to IAEA safeguards reports, Libya received two P2 centrifuges in September 2000 
from Pakistan. Included in this shipment were small uranium hexafluoride cylinders. But, one of 
the P2s was not suitable for enrichment with uranium hexafluoride gas. It did not have the final 
surface coating necessary to prevent corrosion by the gas. In the late 1990s, Libya ordered a 
staggering 10,000 P2 centrifuges from the Khan network. It also placed an order for a 
sophisticated manufacturing center, code-named Workshop 1001, to make centrifuge 
components. The original plan called for this center to produce additional centrifuges—once the 
network delivered the first 10,000—either to replace broken ones or add to the total number. A 
facility containing this many machines would have been able to produce enough highly enriched 
uranium for more than 10 nuclear weapons annually.[5] To supply the Libyan order, the network 
decided to make the centrifuges and related equipment outside Pakistan. Since each P2 machine 
has roughly 100 different components, this order translated into a total of about one million 
components, a staggering number of parts reflecting the sophistication of gas centrifuge 
components. The network was assembling an impressive cast of experts, companies, suppliers, 
and workshops to make these components. It also provided Libyans with centrifuge-related 
training. 
The Khan network intended to provide Libya with a turnkey gas centrifuge facility, something 
typically reserved for states or large corporations in industrialized nations with full government 
support and knowledge.[6] The network also offered ongoing technical assistance to help 
overcome any obstacles in assembling and operating the plant. If Libya had continued to pursue 
its nuclear ambitions and the network had not been exposed, it could have succeeded in 
assembling the centrifuge plant and could be producing significant amounts of highly enriched 
uranium by late in this decade. 
P2 components started to arrive in Libya in December 2002. By December 2003, when the 
program ended, a large number of components had arrived, but not enough to assemble 
complete P2 centrifuges. For example, no maraging steel rotor tubes or bellows had been 
delivered under this order. Other equipment for the centrifuge plant was also ordered, but not all 
was delivered by December 2003.  
By late 2003, Libya had received an extensive collection of equipment and materials for 
Workshop 1001. Most of the machine tools, furnaces, and other equipment for the center came 
from Europe, particularly from or through Spain and Italy. The equipment was not necessarily on 
the nuclear dual-use list, but it was still adequate for use in a centrifuge manufacturing program, 
particularly because the network also supplied detailed manufacturing information for almost all 
the parts. As in the Iraq case, the bulk of this equipment was sent to Libya via Dubai. 
In addition to the means to produce fissile material, the Khan network also gave Libya the 
information necessary to build a nuclear weapon. Libya stated that it received the documents in 
late 2001 or early 2002, but claimed that it took no steps to act on the information or even to 
assess its credibility or practical utility. 
The nuclear weapons documents and drawings collectively represented very dangerous 
information that far exceeded that found in public or on the internet. The key documents and all 
the drawings were in English. The information in these documents strikingly confirmed the public 
reports that China provided significant nuclear weapons help to Pakistan, including the A.Q. Khan 
Laboratories, in the early 1980s. As such, the documents demonstrated serious nuclear weapons 
proliferation both by China in the early 1980s and later by Pakistan.  
The set of documents turned over by Libya details nuclear weapon theory, the design and 
purpose of individual components, and the assembly of an implosion-type nuclear weapon, 
including drawings of almost all (95-97 percent) of this weapon design. The level of technical 
precision and detail in the documents would have allowed Libya to manufacture most of the 
components with a high confidence that they would work.  
Although the components are discussed conceptually in the documents, their development and 
construction would have been challenging for Libya. The absence of these drawings would have 
required Libya to go back to the source for more information or to conduct a development and 
testing program to build them. As mentioned above, Libya has denied doing either.  
The documents do not contain any direct evidence that they came from Pakistan. However, they 
were reportedly handed over to IAEA inspectors in two white plastic shopping bags from a 
Pakistani clothing shop.[7]  
The design provided by the Khan documents appears to be for a Chinese warhead that was 
tested on a missile in 1966, has a mass of about 500 kilograms, and measures about 0.8-0.9 
meter in diameter. This design includes the first steps China took to reduce the size of its nuclear 
weapons. Although the design is old, weapons experts judged it as “very well engineered.”[8] 
The nuclear weapon described in the documents would not fit into Libya’s Scud-Bs or Scud-Cs, 
its longest-range ballistic missiles. It did, however, appear deliverable by North Korea’s Nodong 
missile, Iran’s Shahab-3 missile, and ballistic missiles Iraq was pursuing just prior to the 1991 
Persian Gulf War. Thus, this design would be highly useful to countries such as Iran and North 
Korea. 
North Korea 
Little information is available about Khan’s assistance to North Korea or the extent of the 
Pakistani government’s knowledge or participation in such assistance. Khan is known to have 
traveled to North Korea, and North Koreans are known to have visited the Khan Research 
Laboratories until at least 2001. Pakistani government statements about the visits, however, 
focus on conventional weapons cooperation and deny any official nuclear cooperation. Of the 
three main customers, North Korea is viewed as the one that the Pakistani government is most 
likely to have known about or to have approved the transfer of centrifuge assistance. 
Pyongyang has denied that it has a gas centrifuge program. Despite its denials, however, 
evidence strongly suggests that North Korea has received centrifuge components—and other 
know-how—from the Khan network.  
North Korea has also denied receiving nuclear weapon designs from the network. Nonetheless, 
as a result of the assistance provided to Libya and offered to Iraq, suspicions remain that the 
Khan network routinely offered these designs to its customers, including North Korea. 
U.S. officials have stated repeatedly that information on North Korea’s centrifuge program is 
limited. The IAEA is not involved in an active investigation of Khan’s assistance to North Korea. 
Currently, details remain sparse about who brokered the deals—and where and when key 
meetings took place.  
Despite growing consensus on the existence of a gas centrifuge program, governments and 
experts differ on the status and scope of North Korea’s gas centrifuge program. U.S. government 
officials have stated that North Korea may be close to finishing a production plant involving 
thousands of centrifuges, able to make enough HEU for several nuclear weapons per year. Other 
governments and independent experts have debated whether or not North Korea is that close to 
finishing such a facility. There are also questions about whether North Korea’s effort has slowed 
with the arrest of key players in the Khan network and with increased scrutiny of North Korea’s 
procurements. 
Non-State Actors 
It is known that Khan traveled to Afghanistan between 1997 and 2003, increasing suspicions that 
Khan or his associates may have offered nuclear aid to al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations. 
In particular, concerns remain that Pakistani scientists transferred nuclear weapon designs to 
these groups. 
Uncovering the Network 
Khan’s activities have been closely watched by U.S. and other intelligence agencies since the 
late 1970s. There were early indications of Khan’s willingness to disseminate sensitive nuclear 
information. He co-authored a series of articles with his colleagues at the A.Q. Khan Research 
Laboratories (KRL) near Islamabad. The series was published in technical journals on nuclear 
technology in the late 1980s. In addition to expressing contempt for Western controls, these 
articles contained information about centrifuge assembly and components, information 
considered classified in the West. They may also have served to advertise what Khan was willing 
to offer would-be customers. 
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, Western intelligence agencies learned of additional signs 
that Khan was selling his wares to others, particularly Iran and North Korea. In 1995, the IAEA 
obtained Iraqi memoranda that exposed Khan’s offer to Iraq of centrifuge assistance and nuclear 
weapons design information from 1990.  
By the late 1990s, intelligence agencies had indications that Khan had provided centrifuge 
assistance to both Iran and North Korea. But U.S. efforts to limit Khan’s activities were ineffective, 
partly because of conflicting U.S. and Pakistani priorities, as well as an incomplete picture of the 
network’s activities gleaned from on-going intelligence efforts. 
Whenever the United States did confront the Pakistani government about Khan, Islamabad would 
typically deny U.S. accusations against Khan and his associates. The United States was unwilling 
or unable to provide sufficient evidence to leverage a change in Pakistan’s views.  
Complicating any crackdown on Khan was the Pakistani government’s concern that such an 
action could seriously disrupt its own nuclear weapons program. Khan, after all, controlled the 
critical program that had succeeded in making large amounts of nuclear explosive materials, the 
most difficult step in building nuclear weapons.  
In addition, by the 1990s Khan had become an almost legendary figure in Pakistan for his exploits, 
an image Khan carefully cultivated. He was the recipient of frequent prestigious awards and 
appointments. Some even expected him to seek a high political office. 
By early 2003, the British and U.S. governments had become concerned enough about evidence 
they were collecting that they finally decided to take steps to shut down the network. The United 
States and Britain decided to seize a shipment of centrifuge parts aboard the BBC China. This 
German-registered ship had earlier left Malaysia for Dubai and then was bound for Libya. In early 
October 2003, the ship was diverted to Italy in a coordinated intelligence operation involving U.S. 
and British intelligence agencies and Italian and German authorities. The seizure provided direct 
evidence of a secret and substantial Libyan gas-centrifuge program being supplied through an 
illicit black market.  
After the seizure of the BBC China and with Libya’s subsequent cooperation, the Khan network 
was exposed and Pakistan came under intense pressure to deal with Khan and his associates. 
Nonetheless, the Pakistani government initially resisted arresting Khan. U.S. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell recalled in December 2004 that he had called President General Pervez Musharraf 
in early 2004, telling him, “We know so much about this that we’re going to go public with it, and 
within a few weeks, okay? And you need to deal with this before you have to deal with it publicly.” 
According to Powell, “[T]he next thing we knew, A.Q. Khan had been put in custody.”[9]  
After his arrest in February 2004, Khan confessed to selling sensitive nuclear technology, 
components, and equipment to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. He received a conditional pardon 
and today remains under house arrest with very little access to outsiders. Khan also maintained 
that he alone was responsible and had acted independently of current and previous Pakistani 
governments—a statement that many experts view with skepticism as an apparent attempt to 
prevent Islamabad’s further embarrassment.[10] 
Although many Pakistanis have been detained since the scandal broke, none have been 
prosecuted. The Pakistani government has provided the IAEA and foreign governments with 
information about Khan’s activities, but has not allowed anyone outside the Pakistani government 
to interview Khan or other detainees. Although the IAEA has been allowed to submit written 
questions for Khan to answer, this type of exchange is not a substitute for direct access to Khan 
and his associates. 
Awaiting major breakthroughs in Pakistan, attention has focused on investigations conducted by 
national authorities and the IAEA in an effort to fully understand the network, its key suppliers, 
and its operations, as well as the history and procurement activities of the network’s customers. 
The striking revelation of just how widespread the network had become has led to prosecutions 
and investigations in many countries. 
Implications for International Nonproliferation Regimes 
Without extensive reforms to national and international nonproliferation systems, the risk of 
another illicit nuclear trade network emerging remains high. Even after the Khan network is shut 
down, remnants of the smuggling ring may coalesce into a new one. 
In the future, North Korea could replace Pakistan as a major supplier. Iran could also begin to sell 
centrifuge technology if its fissile material programs are not limited by European Union or global 
initiatives to halt them. In addition, a new network of scientists and businessmen may decide to 
exploit existing loopholes in the nonproliferation system. In order to prevent new illegal networks 
and thwart existing smuggling rings, changes in international regimes are necessary. Already, 
public revelations about the Khan network have intensified support for improving those regimes 
already in place that address nuclear proliferation. In particular, the network’s exposure has 
reenergized efforts to strengthen inspections and national and international export controls. 
In direct response to the activities of the Khan network, President George W. Bush called for a 
wide set of reforms in a February 2004 speech at the National Defense University in Washington, 
D.C. He proposed a broad strategy to strengthen and improve both domestic and international 
nonproliferation efforts. In addition, he introduced new measures designed to enable the United 
States and the international community to increase the likelihood of detecting illicit trade in 
nuclear-related materials.[11] Among these steps were expanding the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI); strengthening the legal framework governing proliferation, in particular a UN 
Security Council resolution requiring states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, 
and secure sensitive materials; expanding efforts to secure nuclear material in the former Soviet 
Union and other states; denying enrichment and reprocessing technology to any state that does 
not already possess them; requiring countries to implement the IAEA’s advanced safeguards 
Additional Protocol as a necessary condition for supplying equipment and materials for civilian 
nuclear programs; and reforming the IAEA to improve its capability to enforce states’ obligations. 
Many international bodies have also responded by adopting various measures—UN Security 
Council Resolution 1540, reforms considered by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), expansion 
of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 Global Partnership’s Action Plan on Nonproliferation, 
and proposed steps to strengthen IAEA investigations. 
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 
In April 2004, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1540. It requires all states to criminalize 
proliferation to non-state actors and to establish, review, and maintain appropriate and effective 
export control systems. This resolution, which the United States had first proposed in September 
2003, fills an important gap in existing nonproliferation regimes by including an export control law 
requirement for all 191 UN member states, and by targeting non-state actors. Because its 
requirements apply to all states, this resolution offers a remedy for some of the problems resulting 
from the NSG’s voluntary, limited membership. Extensive assistance will be necessary because 
many states, however well-intentioned, will experience difficulties in enacting, implementing, and 
enforcing effective export control legislation. 
Nuclear Suppliers Group Reforms 
The Nuclear Suppliers Group has considered steps designed to address systemic weaknesses 
that contributed to the Khan network’s success. At the May 2004 NSG plenary meeting in 
Göteborg, Sweden, the NSG decided that, as part of their national export control laws, all 
member states should adopt a catch-all mechanism. This useful tool, which is already in place in 
many countries, gives NSG members the legal authority to refuse to allow an item to be exported, 
even if it is not included on a control list, if that item might be intended for use in a nuclear 
weapons program.  
The NSG also commits states to consider additional factors, such as items whose specifications 
fall just below those requiring controls and known information about the imports and proliferation 
credentials of the recipient country. In addition, NSG members debated requiring states to 
implement the IAEA Additional Protocol as a condition for supplying nuclear items for civilian use.  
The NSG has also considered further expanding its membership, but remains hesitant to do so. 
The Khan network has shown that some states, such as Malaysia, that are not generally 
considered actual or potential suppliers of nuclear items may have advanced industrial 
infrastructures that can be exploited to produce direct-use nuclear items such as centrifuge 
components. Expanding membership in the NSG would enable other countries to improve their 
export control systems and allow them to receive help from more experienced members. But after 
significant expansion over the last decade, as highlighted by the cases of South Africa and 
Turkey, many current NSG members cannot implement the controls they accepted when they 
joined the organization. Thus, leading members of the NSG, including the United States, are 
reluctant to expand the group more until controls among all existing members are improved. 
Proliferation Security Initiative 
Another policy area undergoing change as a result of the revelations about the Khan network is 
the PSI, defined by the U.S. Department of State as “a global effort that aims to stop shipments of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide.”[12] 
The successful seizure of the BBC China demonstrated the importance of the PSI as an 
enforcement tool, but also highlighted some of its weaknesses and controversies. Because it is a 
set of activities, and not an organization, the PSI may be vulnerable to changes in administration. 
For example, the program is not directly funded but is supported through existing diplomatic 
resources.[13] In addition, the PSI can suffer from lack of intelligence. Even though the PSI was 
responsible for the successful seizure of Malaysian-made centrifuge parts on the BBC China, the 
ship also contained many centrifuge parts made in Turkey that were not intercepted by the United 
States and its allies. This incident revealed how much the PSI depends on critical intelligence 
that—even in optimum cases, can be incomplete.  
G-8 Global Partnership 
The G-8 Global Partnership reached agreement on an Action Plan on Nonproliferation at the Sea 
Island summit in July 2004.[14] The G-8 partners agreed that exporting “sensitive items with 
proliferation potential” should be allowed only in a manner consistent with nonproliferation norms 
and should be limited to states committed to these norms. In the action plan, the G-8 members 
made a commitment to pursue these goals by amending the NSG guidelines as appropriate and 
by working to gain widespread support for these measures. While pursuing these efforts, G-8 
partners agreed not to initiate any new contracts that provide reprocessing or uranium-enrichment 
equipment and technologies to additional states for one year. A complete, long-term ban on such 
contracts will be difficult to achieve within the framework of either the G-8 or the NSG, although 
the United States is expected to continue to work toward achieving this important goal. 
IAEA Safeguards 
The Khan network confirmed the weaknesses of traditional IAEA inspections in detecting 
undeclared nuclear facilities and materials. It highlighted the need for all states to implement the 
IAEA’s Additional Protocol in order to increase reporting by states and expand the rights of 
inspectors to verify that information. This case has also shown why the IAEA needs to receive 
more information from states about their exports and imports of key, sensitive dual-use items. In 
the cases of Iran and Libya, the IAEA has retroactively received a wide variety of information 
about their imports of sensitive dual-use equipment, materials, and technology. The agency is 
now in a much stronger position to perform its responsibilities in those states—to make a 
determination about their compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and to take 
the steps necessary to develop confidence that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or 
materials in these two countries. 
Because Iran and Libya lied to the IAEA about their nuclear activities, they were under intense 
international pressure to be more transparent with the IAEA. Under normal circumstances, 
however, the IAEA receives limited information about countries’ exports and imports. The IAEA’s 
Additional Protocol does require states to report on exports of direct-use nuclear items; however 
reports of exports of dual-use nuclear items would be more useful. Dual-use items are more likely 
to be exported with a license, albeit with a false end-use declaration. They would be reportable to 
the IAEA and subject to scrutiny aimed at revealing undeclared activities in a country of concern. 
Requiring states to report on a wider variety of exports and imports would be a logical extension 
of the current safeguards that place great emphasis on developing a broader picture of a state’s 
nuclear and nuclear-capable infrastructure.  
A New System to Improve Export Controls 
Beyond current reforms, IAEA Director El Baradei has called for a formal international 
arrangement to control exports and imports. In January 2004, El Baradei said that “export 
controls must be dramatically improved and, in contrast to the past, must be carried out within an 
international framework.”[15] A month later, he urged the establishment of universal, “binding, 
treaty-based controls.”[16] El Baradei did not provide any details about a potential treaty, and he 
also apparently recognized the difficulty of actually achieving such a treaty. Nonetheless, his 
proposal warrants further study because it could solve many of the problems in the current 
system of export controls, making it significantly more difficult for nuclear smuggling to occur. 
Conclusion 
The successes of the Khan network should shatter any complacency about how effective national 
and international export controls have been in stopping trade in illegal nuclear or nuclear-related 
materials. Some countries that participated in the illicit trade, such as South Africa and Turkey, 
were even NSG members. Investigations have shown that these countries did not adequately 
implement their national export control and nuclear nonproliferation laws, despite their 
commitments as NSG members. Indeed, because of their countries’ NSG membership, 
companies assisting the Khan network could receive items from other NSG members essentially 
without checks on their potential end uses. The failure of these NSG countries to stop the illicit 
manufacture of centrifuge components is one of the most embarrassing aspects of this scandal. 
The Khan network was also masterful in identifying countries that had sufficient industrial 
capability and an eagerness to make direct-use nuclear items, but had little knowledge of nuclear 
technology or inadequate national export laws, thus making them oblivious or indifferent to the 
actual nature of items. Revelations about the network have highlighted the risk posed by states 
such as Malaysia that are outside the NSG. Because these states were not members, their 
governments and companies were poorly prepared to resist the Khan network’s lucrative offers. 
Many of the network’s suppliers were not aware of the actual purpose of the materials they 
provided, or the parts they were contracted to make. They often were located in countries whose 
authorities were unlikely to scrutinize exports carefully or encourage curiosity about the actual 
end use of an item. In many cases, the companies themselves had little motivation—arising from 
either conscience or threat of punishment—to confirm the cover stories they were given by 
members of the network. 
Members of the network even knew how to exploit loopholes in the much more stringent 
European export control systems in order to obtain necessary subcomponents, materials, 
machine tools, and other manufacturing equipment. For instance, the network depended on 
complicated transportation arrangements to confuse suppliers about the true end use of the item, 
to evade prying intelligence agencies, and to deceive them about the final destination for its 
products. The international free trade zone in Dubai—through which shipments are still subject to 
few meaningful controls—was particularly critical to the network. Indeed, most items found in 
Libya were transported through Dubai, in some cases more than once. 
The A.Q. Khan network exploited loopholes in the existing nationally based system and created a 
network of suppliers, manufacturers, and shippers that provided secret nuclear technology to Iran, 
Libya, North Korea, and perhaps others. Iran and Libya would have been severely hindered in 
their efforts to achieve nuclear weapons capability absent assistance from the Khan network. 
These transfers went largely undetected, and any hints of these dangerous activities were not 
pursued aggressively until relatively recently. With the international community increasingly aware 
of the damage done by the Khan network, it is taking further steps to uncover all aspects of the 
network and prevent future nuclear smuggling. 
At this point, many questions about the extent of the network remain unanswered. While a 
number of individuals have been arrested or identified, investigators worldwide believe that other 
key participants remain at large. Questions also remain about the full extent of these individuals’ 
activities in manufacturing and supplying centrifuges and associated equipment. This task has 
become more complicated because many investigations started slowly, giving the network a 
chance to cover its tracks or destroy evidence. There is a growing recognition that network 
members may have destroyed many key internal documents and records.  
Whether or not all the key workshops and companies have been identified also remains unknown. 
Moreover, it is possible that components for uranium-enrichment plants have been produced for, 
but not delivered to, Libya. Perhaps they have been sent to other, unknown customers. 
Questions remain about the network’s customers. Are all the customers known? In addition, only 
in the case of Libya do investigators have a relatively complete understanding of the items 
supplied by the Khan network.  
The key to the success of Khan’s network was its virtual library of centrifuge designs and detailed 
manufacturing manuals. An important task for investigators is to retrieve as much of this 
information as possible. That effort requires, in turn, tracking down and prosecuting the members 
of the network. Given the ease of copying and hiding documents and digital files, this centrifuge 
information may form the core of a future network aimed at secretly producing or selling gas 
centrifuges. 
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